How community attitudes can strengthen arguments for changing the legal status od animals by Shyam, Geeta
www.ssoar.info
How community attitudes can strengthen
arguments for changing the legal status od animals
Shyam, Geeta
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Shyam, G. (2019). How community attitudes can strengthen arguments for changing the legal status od animals.
Society Register, 3(3), 67-82. https://doi.org/10.14746/sr.2019.3.3.04
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Nicht-kommerziell) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
SOCIETY REGISTER 2019 / 3(3): 67-82
ISSN 2544–5502
DOI: 10.14746/sr.2019.3.3.04
HOW COMMUNITY ATTITUDES CAN STRENGTHEN ARGUMENTS 
FOR CHANGING THE LEGAL STATUS OF ANIMALS
GEETA SHYAM1
1 Monash University, Faculty of Law, Wellington Road, Clayton VIC 3800, Australia. ORCID: 0000-0002-
4797-9573, Email: geetashree.shyam@monash.edu
ABSTRACT: The current legal categorisation of animals as property has its historical 
roots in Roman Law. The long history of this status prompts one to wonder whether it 
reflects modern community attitudes. It is, however, difficult to answer this question, 
as there is a dearth of empirical data on attitudes towards the legal status of animals. 
In light of the widely-accepted relationship between law and community attitudes, 
particularly in democratic societies, this paper highlights the need for empirical ex-
aminations of social attitudes towards the legal status of animals. It is suggested that 
such empirical exercises can help scholars and lawmakers more accurately understand 
whether a change in the legal status of some or all animals is politically achievable. 
Empirical studies of community attitudes can also provide direction to scholars, who 
theorise legal frameworks to define the legal status of animals, and animal advocacy 
groups, which seek to educate the community about the legal status of animals.
KEYWORDS: legal status of animals, animals as property, animal personhood, animal 
rights
Historian Yuval Noah Harari (2011) points out that what distinguishes Homo sapi-
ens from other species of animals is our ability to co-operate with a large number of 
individuals. Homo sapiens have the unique ability to form large groups and to create 
social order amongst millions of people. This ability, which Harari explains emerged 
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as part of the Cognitive Revolution, is enabled through the creation of fiction or what 
Harari describes as imagined realities. Nations, corporations and laws, for example, 
do not exist in real; they are imagined entities or systems developed to enable a large 
number of humans to cooperate. To change how society is organised, or how power is 
distributed, a large enough number of people ought to be convinced about new fiction.
Herein lies the challenge surrounding the legal status of animals. The role of le-
gal fiction is all too familiar for animal lawyers. Indeed, fiction is often brought up 
in debates and litigation about the legal status of animals. A legal person, it is fre-
quently argued, does not necessarily connote a human being. It is a construct of the 
law that can be, and already has been, extended to include non-human entities, such 
as corporations, rivers and idols. The task of “animal rights” advocates, therefore, is 
to convince legal or political institutions that this fictional concept of personhood 
should be expanded to include some or all animals. If successful in doing so, the legal 
fiction regulating human-animal relations would potentially carry significant impli-
cations for society.
This paper emphasises the need to understand community attitudes towards the 
legal status of animals better. It suggests that empirical examinations of social at-
titudes can provide valuable insight into the debate concerning the categorisation 
of animals as property. In particular, knowledge of community attitudes can provide 
a better sense of whether a change in the legal status of some or all animals would 
be politically achievable. It can also provide direction to scholars who theorise legal 
frameworks to define the legal status of animals. Such data can also guide the educa-
tional agenda of advocacy groups, as they can identify issues that are not salient or 
well understood in the community.  
The paper first examines the legal status of animals as property, including the ori-
gins and implications of this status. It then provides an overview of various different 
theoretical frameworks for making animals subjects, rather than objects, of the law. It 
also notes the scepticism expressed by some scholars in respect of proposals to change 
the legal status of animals. It becomes evident at this point that the hypotheses made 
in relation to the feasibility of implementing any of those models are generally based 
on intuition rather than relevant empirical data. This paper then examines the rela-
tionship between law and society to explain the importance of gathering empirical 
data on attitudes towards the property status of animals. The next part observes that 
such empirical evidence is currently lacking; it then proceeds to highlight the findings 
and implications of an Australian study that reveals a lack of community awareness 
about the legal status of animals and indicates that attitudes towards the legal status 
of animals are variegated. Finally, this paper concludes by providing direction for fu-
ture research in this space.
To clarify, it is not the intention of this paper to suggest that the legal status of an-
imals should be determined by community attitudes alone. It is appreciated that such 
an exercise can be misguided, as community attitudes may not always be aligned with 
moral principles. Further, human behaviour may not always accord with prevailing so-
cial values (Gibson 1985). Even though certain values may be highly regarded in soci-
ety, economic or habitual factors may compel humans to act contrary to those values. 
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Additionally, empirical data may not always provide an accurate account of communi-
ty attitudes. For example, often, respondents do not have an opinion about questions 
they are asked in a survey, especially where they relate to complex issues (Burstein 
2006). In such cases, reliance on empirical data alone can be imprudent. The aim of 
this paper, therefore, is merely to highlight the value of measuring and understanding 
community attitudes in informing the debate about the legal status of animals and in 
determining an appropriate legal status for some or all animals. 
THE LEGAL STATUS OF ANIMALS
Most animals in western countries are classified as things or property. Property rights 
in respect of wild animals are generally more restricted in comparison to domestic 
animals, but they lack personhood, nevertheless. The legal categorisation of ani-
mals as property can be traced at least as far back as Roman Laws. Under Roman Law, 
everything was divided into three legal categories: personae (persons), res (things) and 
actiones (actions) (Naffine 2009; Thomas 1976).  Persons were entities capable of be-
ing affected by the law, while things were rights and duties that persons could have. 
Thus, persons were the subjects of the law, while things were objects of the law. With-
in this tripartite system, animals were classed as things (Pottage 2004). Roman Law 
ultimately inspired civil and common law systems throughout the world, including 
the British Common Law system that went on to be adopted in many other British 
colonies (Cao 2015; Domingo 2011). The categories of persons and things and the 
legal objectification of animals were carried forward and kept alive in the process. 
The treatment of animals as the property was justified in later centuries by Chris-
tian beliefs. For example, eighteenth-century philosopher, William Blackstone (1794), 
explained that animals were the property of humans because God gave humans do-
minion over everything that lived on Earth. Secular beliefs too glorified the status of 
humans in light of humans’ advanced cognitive abilities and, on that basis, provided 
further justification for the property categorisation of animals (Naffine 2012).
The categories of persons and things were never defined or clearly differentiated 
by Gaius and Justinian, the jurists who originally conceptualised and adopted these 
terms (Trahan 2008; Kurki 2017a). There is some indication that the categories were 
not intended to be exclusive. Salves, for instance, were categorised as both persons 
and things (Kurki 2017b). However, the meanings attached to the terms “person” and 
“thing” have remained elusive and contested. Indeed, there are debates today about 
the meaning and requirements of personhood. 
While the legal divide between persons and things continues to be evident in com-
mon law and civil law systems, the categories have evolved over time to suit chang-
ing needs and times. Scientific, technological and social developments have blurred 
the lines between the two categories, giving rise to debates about the legal status of 
the unborn, the dead, non-biological machines and nature (Pottage 2004). In light of 
growing environmental consciousness, for example, a few rivers, forests and moun-
tains around the world have been declared to be legal persons (Maloney 2018).
Similarly, scientific developments and changing relationships between humans and 
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animals have called into question the appropriateness of the property status of ani-
mals. Towards the end of the 20th century, philosophical and legal minds started to 
question whether animals should be persons rather than property. Francione (1995) 
was one of the first to argue that sentient animals should be persons rather than prop-
erty and that all forms of animal use should be abolished as a result. Since then, a 
variety of arguments for and against animal personhood have been put forward in a 
passionate and growing debate.
Animals are different from other types of property. Unlike chairs and cars, animals 
are sentient, living beings. As objects of the law, they are theoretically at the mercy of 
persons who are subjects of the law. While there are undoubtedly animal welfare laws 
that recognise the sentience of animals and seek to curtail the property rights of hu-
mans with respect to animals, animals are unable to enforce the protections granted 
to them under those laws. That is because legal standing is required to enforce those 
protections, and legal personhood is generally a requirement for legal standing (Tudor 
2010; Stein 1979; Bagaric and Akers 2012). A more serious implication of the proper-
ty status of animals, some argue, is that animals are disqualified from bearing rights 
(Korsgaard 2013; Wise 2000). Not everyone agrees with this position, as some argue 
that animals as property can and do have rights, albeit in a weak form (Sunstein 2003; 
Favre 2010).
The property status of animals has a number of other implications. As personal 
property, which can be subject to ownership, sale, purchase, gifts and theft, animals 
are commodified. The commodification of animals is most apparent in animal farming 
and in the breeding, selling and relinquishing of companion animals (White 2016). 
The treatment of animals as commodities is problematic because it “enables the in-
strumental treatment [of animals] by others subject only to a de minimis standard of 
regulation” (Deckha 2015:64). At a symbolic level, too, the property status of animals 
promotes the objectification and instrumental treatment of animals. The semantics 
imply that animals are a means to an end, rather than ends in themselves. Such a per-
spective can overlook the inherent interests or intrinsic value of animals (Bogdanoski 
2013).
MAKING ANIMALS SUBJECTS OF THE LAW
In light of the sentience of animals, as well as the shortcomings associated with the 
property status of animals, a debate has emerged about whether the property status of 
animals should be abolished. Those who are opposed to the property status of animals 
often contend that animals should be regarded as legal persons. Francione and Wise 
take this position, although the scope and approach of their arguments differ.
Francione (1995; 1996; 2000; 2008; 2010) strongly opposes all forms of animal use, 
particularly the use of sentient animals. His position is premised on the belief that 
sentient animals, which possess some level of self-awareness, have an interest in liv-
ing and not suffering. These interests, he argues, are incompatible with their charac-
terisation as property. He points out that animals share an interest in not suffering 
from humans. Applying the principle of equal consideration, which requires likes to 
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be treated alike, Francione argues that like humans, animals too should not be treated 
as property. Francione thus demands the abolition of the property status of sentient 
animals, and advocates for the recognition of their right not to be treated as property. 
Because he believes that personhood is a perquisite for legal rights, he calls for ani-
mals to be granted legal personhood. 
The consequences of Francione’s vision would be significant if materialised. He ac-
knowledges that the implications of the abolitionist view are radical. It would mean 
that the institutionalised exploitation of animals for food, biomedical research, cloth-
ing and entertainment would have to end. Given the prevalence of animal-use prac-
tices today, it does seem unlikely that the community is likely to support an end to 
all forms of animal use. However, whether there is sufficient community support for 
the abolition of animal-use and whether there is sufficient community support for 
animal personhood or an alternative legal status for animals, are different questions. 
While the previous question is likely to be answered in the negative, there is a lack of 
empirical data from which the answer to the latter question can be extrapolated. Even 
if it appears that legal personhood for all sentient animals is too ambitious, it is worth 
questioning whether there might be adequate community support for changing the 
legal status of at least some animals.
Wise (2000; 2002; 2004) pursues this question. While Francione’s arguments are 
founded on purely moral considerations, Wise accepts that “progress is impeded by 
physical, economic, political, religious, historical, legal and psychological obstacles” 
(2002:9). Wise, therefore, advocates for the personhood of only a small class of ani-
mals, for the purposes of a limited set of rights. In particular, he argues that animals 
that possess practical autonomy should be recognised as legal persons who are enti-
tled to the rights to liberty and equality. A being has practical autonomy if they can 
desire, intentionally try to fulfil their desire, and possess some level of self-awareness. 
Wise suggests that the more the behaviour of an animal resembles human behaviour, 
and the taxonomically closer the animal is to humans, the more likely the animal is 
to possess practical autonomy. At the very least, based on current scientific literature, 
Wise identifies great apes, Atlantic bottle-nosed dolphins, African elephants, and Af-
rican grey parrots as animals that meet the requirements of personhood.
The peril of Wise’s approach is that it could re-draw the lines of the existing hier-
archy that places the human species over all other species. It would deny personhood 
to animals that lack practical autonomy, or animals that have not scientifically been 
proven to possess the required cognitive abilities. It should be remembered, however, 
that it is not Wise’s intention to deny personhood to animals that lack practical au-
tonomy. He makes it transparent that “[i]]f I was Chief Justice of the Universe, I might 
make the simpler capacity to suffer, rather than practical autonomy, sufficient for per-
sonhood and dignity rights” (2002:32). Wise employs a narrow-focused approach be-
cause he is conscious of the significant resistance to the idea of making all sentient 
animals legal persons, especially in light of the wide-ranging implications of a sen-
tience-based strategy.
Not everyone who disagrees with the current legal status of animals pushes for 
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animal personhood. Favre (2000; 2004; 2004), for example, proposes a guardianship 
model. Animals would remain property under this model, but instead of having own-
ers, they would have guardians who are required to act in the best interests of the an-
imals. Favre is mindful that the legal status of animals depends in large part on what 
society thinks. On this basis, he stresses “it is important to distinguish first steps of 
change within the legal system, where maximum consensus ought to exist, versus the 
ultimate destination of legal change” (2004:236). Recognising political and social re-
alities, Favre suggests an incremental approach ought to be taken where the property 
status of animals is modified rather than abolished.
Under this modified approach, title to an animal would be divided into legal and eq-
uitable elements. Humans would retain legal title to the animal, while animals would 
have equitable self-ownership. The legal title owner would owe duties directly to the 
self-owned animal and would be required to make decisions that are in the best inter-
ests of the self-owned animal. Self-owned animals would also have the ability, through 
court-appointed guardians or private parties, to enforce their legally recognised in-
terests. Ultimately, Favre seeks to develop a model for animals that provides “an in-
termediate ground between being only property and being freed of property status, 
where the interests of animals are recognised by the legal system, but the framework 
of property law is still used for limited purposes” (2000:476). However, he acknowl-
edges that this model too can only be implemented if it finds social acceptance. 
More recently, recognising the social approval needed to make drastic changes to 
the legal status of animals, Favre (2010) proposed a more conservative model where 
sentient animals would be placed in a new subcategory of the property called “living 
property”. It is important to recognise that, unlike Francione and Wise, Favre contends 
that animals as property can and do have legal rights.  Thus, he considers it ethically 
acceptable, at least in present times and subject to some modifications, to retain the 
property status of animals.
According to Favre, animals with DNA have inherent interests and moral value. 
Thus, the law ought to protect the interests of animals. Despite the broad implica-
tions of his position on the moral status of all, rather than just sentient animals, he 
proposes two qualifications for eligibility into the category of living property. First, 
the animals have to be knowingly possessed by humans. This would exclude most wild 
animals. Second, the category would be restricted to vertebrate animals to “keep the 
discussion focused on those who have the most complex needs and for whom we can 
do the most” (2010:1045-6); Favre does suggest, however, that this line could be re-
drawn in the future as more scientific information on the interests of non-vertebrate 
animals becomes available. Because legal personality is a prerequisite for legal stand-
ing, the existing property would be granted limited personality. This would enable 
living property to enforce their interests. As to which interests the law would protect, 
Favre believes it is a “social and, therefore, political judgement” (2010:1053). Hence, 
the law would protect those interests that can garner sufficient political support. 
Pietrzykowski (2017; 2018) also offers an innovative approach for the legal treat-
ment of animals. Rather than advocate for animal personhood, he believes that a new 
legal category ought to be established for sentient animals. The new legal category, 
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called non-personal subjects of law, would make sentient animals subjects of the law 
without granting them legal personhood. Pietrzykowski’s approach is constructed on 
the belief that sentient animals do not belong in either of the categories of persons 
or things. He is of the opinion that the sentience of animals makes their treatment as 
things inappropriate, but they also lack capacities that are generally associated with 
personhood. Pietrzykowski further suggests that personhood is not necessary for an-
imals to become subjects of law because, contrary to popular belief, the categories of 
persons and things are not exhaustive. He contends that the establishment of a new 
legal category would recognise the similarities between humans and animals without 
ignoring the differences between humans and other animal species.
As non-personal subjects of law, animals would be capable of bearing rights. In 
particular, animals would have a single right to have their interests considered in all 
decisions affecting the realisation of those interests, including decisions made by law-
makers and individuals. This right would ensure that the interests of animals cannot 
be ignored. Pietrzykowski accepts that merely mandating the consideration of an-
imals’ interests may not produce significantly different outcomes from the present 
framework where animals are property. He explains, however, that his goal is not to 
provide for the immediate eradication of all animal suffering but to design a system 
for facilitating gradual attitudinal shifts and improvements to the conditions of ani-
mals. Accordingly, the legal protections provided to animals must not go beyond pre-
dominant social expectations; rather, they should be reconcilable with existing prac-
tices. It follows for Pietrzykowski that the extent to which this model will be able to 
protect the interests of animals better will depend on the evolution of social attitudes. 
With several different models proposed for defining the legal status of animals, it 
is natural to wonder which of these models could successfully be implemented with 
the least amount of controversy or resistance. Currently, there is limited empirical 
data that sheds much light. Without empirical evidence, one can only speculate about 
whether any of those alternative legal statuses for some or all animals would find so-
cial acceptance.  Indeed, arguments in favour of abolishing the property status of an-
imals are often met with pessimism. These too appear to be based on intuition rather 
than empirical evidence.
Garner (2002; 2010a; 2010b; 2016), for example, does not necessarily disagree with 
the goal of abolishing the property status of animals. However, he contends that the 
ambition is unachievable in the current political climate. Distinguishing between what 
is ethical and what is politically achievable, Garner asserts that the property status of 
animals is “merely a reflection of wider societal attitudes” (2002:80). Garner’s calcu-
lations may appear correct in light of existing animal-use practices. However, without 
empirical data, it is difficult to assess the extent to which Garner’s predictions are cor-
rect. While his conclusions about social attitudes might indeed be accurate, it is also 
possible that attitudes towards the legal status of animals are more nuanced. It may be 
that there is sufficient community support for the abolition of the property status of at 
least some animals, such as the cognitively advanced animals or companion animals.
For Lovvorn (2006), arguing for the abolition of the property status of animals is an 
“intellectual indulgence” (p. 139). Relying on a number of American polls, he asserts 
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that abolishing the property status of animals is politically unachievable. The data 
Lovvorn refers to does suggest a lack of support for bans on the use of animals in 
medical research, product testing, hunting and clothing. However, the data does not 
illuminate attitudes towards the legal categorisation of animals as property or alter-
native legal status. The statistical evidence that forms the basis of Lovvorn’s sceptical 
position does not necessarily indicate community support for the current legal status 
of animals.
Similar predictions have been made more recently by Cupp (2007; 2016; 2018). 
Cupp agrees that human-animal relations in urbanised and industrialised societies 
commonly involve emotional, rather than purely economic, connections. He further 
accepts that public support for better animal protection laws is likely to continue to 
grow. He believes, however, that most people oppose the idea of legal personhood for 
animals. Again, there is a lack of empirical data to back this cynicism. The deductions 
made by Garner, Lovvorn and Cupp from current social practices may indeed be cor-
rect. However, without empirical evidence, they remain speculations that do not nec-
essarily weigh any greater than the assumptions embedded in the works of those who 
propose an alternative legal status for animals. 
A review of existing literature on the legal status of animals thus highlights the 
need to measure community attitudes towards the legal status of animals. Such em-
pirical research is needed to test the hypothesis that abolition of the property status 
of animals is politically unachievable. It is also needed to ascertain whether the alter-
native legal statuses for animals proposed by proponents of change would enjoy com-
munity support. This data may ultimately add strength to arguments for abolishing 
the property status of some or all animals, particularly in light of the interconnected-
ness between law and social attitudes. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND SOCIETY
To appreciate the importance of surveying community attitudes towards the legal sta-
tus of animals, the relationship between law and society needs to be understood. It 
will perhaps seem obvious to most people that “[l]aw is a social phenomenon” (An-
leu 2000:1). Notwithstanding this intuitive belief, law and society scholars have been 
studying the relationship between law and society for a long time. It is widely accept-
ed within this scholarly field that law mirrors or reflects the values of the society in 
which it operates (Selznick 2006). Friedman (1996), for example, observes specifically 
in respect of western legal systems:
Legal systems do not float in some cultural void, free of space and time and social 
context; necessarily, they reflect what is happening in their own societies. In the 
long run, they assume the shape of those societies, like a glove that moulds [sic] 
itself to the shape of a person’s hand (p. 72).
The extent to which law reflects community attitudes should not be overstated. 
As Tamanaha (2001) thoroughly explains, there are a number of reasons why the law 
often does not reflect the prevailing attitudes in society. The voluntary or involun-
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tary transplantation of laws is one such cause, resulting in an alien society having a 
greater influence over the laws of a particular state. An excellent example of this is the 
adoption of colonial laws in countries such as Australia, a process through which the 
property status of animals was inherited.
Further, Tamanaha points out that complex societies have warranted sophisticated 
commercial and administrative laws that are inspired to a greater extent by economic 
considerations than social values. Corporations, securities and other complex com-
mercial legislation provide good examples. Globalisation too has diluted the extent 
to which laws mirror a local society, as often laws are introduced by a state to remain 
part of international institutions or agreements, such as the European Union or the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
However, despite presenting a detailed critique of the mirror thesis, even Tamanaha 
does not deny the relationship between law and society. To say that a range of factors 
can influence the content of law does not entirely negate the relationship between law 
and society. Arguably, even complex commercial and administrative legislation are 
founded on social values of justice and fairness. It is true, as Tamanaha suggests that 
societies now have less influence over laws in comparison to traditional and less com-
plex societies. Nonetheless, an essential connection between law and society remains.
The connection between law and society is especially expected in democratic soci-
eties. A democratic society requires that “decisions implemented on its behalf reflect 
the preferences of its members” (Przeworski 2010). It is premised on the principle of 
self-governance or “rule by the people” (Tideman 1994). The rationale behind democ-
racy is that citizens are not coerced into complying with the legal order. Instead, they 
freely provide consent to be bound by that legal order (Komberg and Clarke 1992). So-
ciety’s influence over law may not be obvious or direct in a representative democracy, 
where representatives are chosen by society to govern the country (Schumpeter 2013). 
Nevertheless, the idea behind a representative democracy is still to enforce the will 
of the people – or at least a majority of the people – through the election process and 
representative governments (Plotke 1997). 
It would be naïve to suggest that society is homogenous. While “[r]epresentative 
government was born under an ideology that postulated a basic harmony of interests 
in society” (Przeworski 2010: 20), it is certainly not the case today.  Societies today are 
more likely to be pluralistic in nature, where there are competing values and attitudes 
(Jacobs 2014). Consequently, self-governance in such societies is better described as a 
system where “the reins of government should be handed to those who command more 
support than do any of the competing individuals or teams” (Schumpeter 2013:272). 
In representative democracies, therefore, elected governments and legislatures seek 
to balance and juggle conflicting public views.
A benefit of aligning the law with society’s expectations is that people are more 
likely to comply with laws that conform to community attitudes (Tyler 1990). Such 
conformity provides substantive legitimacy. It is achieved where the law is perceived 
by the community to be consistent with community attitudes (Wintgens 2007). In oth-
er words, legitimacy is derived from the rational justifications for the law. It is in light 
of the tendency of people to comply with substantively legitimate laws that Tyler and 
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Darley (2000) suggest that “focusing upon the social values held by the public is one 
key component of an effort to create and sustain a legal order, the effectiveness of 
which is linked to the consent and cooperation of citizens” (p. 708).
The connection between law and society implies that legal change and social change 
are also related. That legal change follows social change is not controversial. This is 
demonstrated by the development and strengthening of animal welfare laws through-
out the world (Herzog, Rowan and Kossow 2001). What is contentious is the idea that 
legal change can lead to social change. Many accept that legal change can engineer 
social change (Friedman 1973; Castro 2012). The regulation of smoking and the supply 
of tobacco products, for example, have been found to have changed smoking habits in 
different societies (Cummings 2002; Orbell 2009; Lidón-Moyano 2017) However, it is 
unlikely that legal change can affect radical social change. Law is unlikely to inspire 
social change if it conflicts too much with prevailing values and moral ideals, or if the 
law is not supported by powerful and elite members of society (Vago and Barkan 2017). 
Nevertheless, while the extent to which social change and legal change can lead each 
other may not be equal, there is a growing recognition that law and society have a 
circular, reciprocal relationship. Both occur in tandem and influence each other (Sifris 
2010).
WHAT DOES SOCIETY THINK ABOUT THE LEGAL STATUS OF ANIMALS?
Once the relationship between law and society is comprehended, and the history of 
the property characterisation of animals appreciated, the value of examining social 
attitudes towards the legal status of animals becomes apparent. Currently, it is diffi-
cult to describe community attitudes in this context accurately. Data about attitudes 
towards the legal status of animals is scarce. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the 
extent to which different societies agree or disagree with the legal classification of an-
imals as property. As a result, it is difficult to draw conclusions about whether the law 
is consistent with modern attitudes. Further, as highlighted earlier, in the absence of 
such knowledge, one can only speculate about whether legal subjecthood for animals, 
in any form, would enjoy communal acceptance.
One small-scale exploratory study undertaken in the Australian state of Victoria 
(Shyam 2018) attempted to explore such attitudes and address these questions. A sur-
vey of 287 Victorians aged over 18 was undertaken in Melbourne city and two rural 
regions of Victoria (Ballarat and Gippsland) between December 2013 and July 2014. A 
short questionnaire consisting of eleven questions was designed to ascertain the ex-
tent of the respondents’ knowledge of the property status of animals, as well as the ex-
tent to which they agreed or disagreed with that status. The self-administered survey 
was conducted at train stations, tram stops and bus stations, employing convenience 
(non-probability) sampling.
A key finding of this research was that knowledge of the property status of animals 
is lacking in society. The study found that over half of the respondents to the survey 
did not know that animals are legally classified as property. Additionally, a third of 
the respondents to the study did not know the implications of legally categorising 
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animals as property. Many of the respondents thought that the property status of an-
imals entitles animals to legal protections for their welfare. This lack of knowledge 
and understanding is problematic because if members of a society are unaware of the 
property status of animals and the implications of such classification, they are un-
likely to challenge, or think critically about, that legal status.  Moreover, without such 
awareness, society is unlikely to evaluate their preference for alternative legal status-
es for animals, such as those described above. 
Noting the lack of awareness about the legal status of animals, this study reported 
common disagreement with the property categorisation of animals. Most respondents 
to the study disagreed with the property status of at least some animals, although the 
study did not ask respondents to identify animals whose property status they did not 
approve of. Before asking respondents whether they agreed with the legal classifica-
tion of animals as property, the survey also asked respondents how they perceived 
their pets (if applicable), farm animals and wild animals. The results indicated that the 
majority of respondents did not perceive any of those categories of animals as proper-
ty, although farm animals were more likely to be perceived as property in comparison 
to pets and wild animals. The results of this study cannot be generalised due to the 
small sample size and the use of non-probability sampling. However, to the extent 
that the results provide a snapshot of modern attitudes towards animals in Victoria, 
these results do lend support to the argument that the property status of animals fails 
to reflect community attitudes. 
This study also highlighted that community attitudes towards animals are varie-
gated. While pets were largely perceived as “members of the family” or “friends”, farm 
animals were more likely to be seen as “living beings different to humans”. Wild ani-
mals were the least likely to be seen as property, and were mostly perceived to be “im-
portant national treasures”. These findings confirmed that different sentiments are 
attached to different kinds of animals. Thus, the study also adds weight to the propo-
sition that different kinds of animals ought to be assigned a different legal status. Le-
gal systems such as the one in Australia already provide different levels of protection 
for different kinds of animals. For example, in all Australian states and territories, the 
welfare of companion animals is protected to a greater extent than farm animals, and 
native animals receive greater protection than introduced species of animals (White 
2013). Such legal systems are therefore already capable of distinguishing between dif-
ferent kinds of animals. As such, it is not difficult to conceive of a legal framework that 
assigns different legal statuses for different kinds of animals.
THE PATH TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL FICTION
In light of the intricate relationship between law and society, it is worthwhile exam-
ining whether centuries-old laws continue to reflect contemporary attitudes. This is 
especially useful where an aspect of the law starts to feel counter-intuitive, such as 
with respect to the legal categorisation of animals as property. In this context, empir-
ical studies can help shed light on whether the categorisation of animals as property 
is consistent with community attitudes. 
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This paper has highlighted that a lot of intellectual effort is being expanded on formu-
lating models for defining the legal status of animals and hypothesising about which 
of these models will work. There is also much deliberation about whether any change 
in the legal status of animals would be socially acceptable. It is suggested that em-
pirical inquiry of community attitudes towards the legal status of animals can inform 
this debate and guide the development of legal models that can successfully be imple-
mented.
Accordingly, it is suggested that attitudes towards animals, especially their legal 
status, should continue to be surveyed. For a truthful understanding of these atti-
tudes, such surveys should ascertain respondents’ awareness and understanding of 
the property status of animals. The surveys should also account for variegated atti-
tudes towards the legal status of animals, and therefore ask respondents whether they 
agree with the property status of specific types of animals. 
If empirical studies continue to support the proposition that some or all animals 
are not perceived as property in contemporary societies, arguments for abolishing the 
property status of those animals will be strengthened. Such data can then be used to 
persuade and even pressure lawmakers to change the legal status of the relevant kinds 
of animals. Even where different sentiments are attached to different kinds of ani-
mals, the data may help identify animals whose legal status may be easier to change 
than others.
Given that there appears to be a lack of understanding in the community about 
the legal status of animals, education will have an important role to play in efforts 
to change the legal status of animals. The public needs to be educated about the le-
gal status of animals as property, as well as about the implications of giving animals 
that legal status. This education may emanate from advocacy groups in the form of 
awareness campaigns. Incorporation of this subject into school curriculums could also 
ensure a demographically wider understanding of the legal status of animals. This 
knowledge will empower the community to develop informed opinions, and in the 
longer term, prompt lawmakers to review and reassess the legal status of animals.
Education, whether delivered by educational institutions or advocacy groups, can 
be informed by empirical data as well as animal law scholarship. Empirical data will 
highlight knowledge gaps in the community, while animal law scholarship will help 
determine and deliver the educational content. For this reason, it is vital that scholars 
continue to research and deliberate on the implications of legally classifying animals 
as property, and to debate about how animals should be categorised by the law. Such 
academic pursuits should use existing and new empirical data as a reference to inno-
vate or develop alternative legal models for defining the legal status of animals. Thus, 
if attitudes towards animals are variegated, scholars should strive to understand and 
reflect the attitudinal nuances in alternative models. Aside from feeding into educa-
tional initiatives, such scholarship can also assist lawmakers in their reform agendas.
There is no doubt that animal welfare laws are a useful way of eliminating or mini-
mising the suffering of animals. Efforts to improve animal welfare laws should, there-
fore not be reduced. It is important to realise that animal welfare laws do not stand in 
opposition to arguments for abolishing the property status of animals. The need for 
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such laws will continue to exist even if animals become subjects of the law through 
personhood or some other legal categorisation. Just as specific laws exist for the pro-
tection of workers, who are legal persons, it will be necessary to have laws for the pro-
tection of animal subjects.  Animal welfare laws may need to be modified to reflect the 
new legal status of animals, but their use will not become redundant.
Notwithstanding the necessity of animal welfare laws, opportunities to improve the 
legal status of animals must be seized. Failure to do so may keep a fiction alive that 
makes it easier to facilitate the subjection of animals to pain and suffering. Capitalis-
ing on modern community perceptions of animals may add weight to arguments for 
changing the legal status of animals, thereby making it easier to shatter the fabricated 
conception of animals as property. As Harari cautions, imagined reality has become 
more powerful over time, to the point that the survival of objective realities, such as 
rivers, trees and animals, now depends on the grace of imagined entities.
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